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THE ORIGINS OF MAU MAU
Certain fundamental questions had to be answered: Did the British want to overturn the order established in the 1890s and incorporate the 'young men', the disgruntled political activists? Could it be done without threatening complete anarchy or was it not preferable to sit on the lid of rising African political consciousness and hope that it would subside, rather than explode? Was this not, in the last analysis, a less risky option than ' ' We conferred all day, largely on dry, theoretical ideas of colonial self-government totally divorced from the realities of the present day. The C.O. has got itself into a sort of mystic enchantment and see visions of grateful, independent Utopias beaming at them from all round the world, as if there was yet-any reason to suppose that any African can be cashier of a village council for three weeks without stealing the cash. It is uphill work, but we bludgeoned them pretty severely from both sides, although the West Africans, other than Milverton, are a silent lot. There is really no understanding whatever of contemporary realities in the CO. Creech blathered a good deal . . . '.
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AFRICAN AFFAIRS occurred in Buganda in the late 1940s, the colonial authorities backed the establishment rather than their youthful critics.17 These problems confronted all the British colonies, and indeed the whole of Africa, in the immediate post-war era. It can now be seen that colonial governments were presented with a choice between short-term stability with a corollary of longer-term dissatisfaction and mounting political trouble; or shortterm instability with the result of longer-run security. London wanted the latter; colonial governments opted for the former. The stakes at risk with the short-term instability option were seen as too great. Colonial rule had existed for too long, become too entrenched, to live dangerously. Safety first was the rule.
Just as in the late 1920s, when the KCA had first stretched its muscles and the Administration had hesitated as to their response (should it be coopted or suppressed?) the late 1940s show a similar process in their attitude to KAU. 18 Whilst it was moderate and politely functioned within the existing social order in the reserves, it was tolerated, even encouraged, by a few adventurous District Commissioners; but by its nature as a vehicle for educated, self-confident Africans, paradoxically often employed by the government returning askaris, or prosperous peasant farmers and a few traders who had done well out of the high cash crop prices during the war-in fact by its very existence, it posed a challenge to the chiefs. A few could be absorbed, but the number demanding entry into the colonial governing structure in the reserves were out of all proportion to those who could be peacefully co-opted. Only the overturning of the status quo could deal with such 'popularity'. The co-optive capacity of the colonial state, without fundamental restructuring, simply could not cope. It was these people who were to provide the backbone of KAU in Central Province. 1 9
Typical of this group were the ex-askaris, most of whom had never been anywhere near the front line. Their horizons had, however, been immensely broadened and they returned home with more money than most Africans had ever collected before. Such men were discontented with life in the village, eager to enter trade, build stone houses and better their lot. The trouble was not just that their advance as traders, etc., was hindered by the settler communities, European politicians and Asian traders, but also that they encountered the suspicions of the chiefs and elders and therefore, These men, however, did not become Mau Mau. Even after they had lost all their money in speculative ventures, they were reluctant to contemplate violence, if only because they were only too well aware of the overwhelming forces the colonial state had in its possession to suppress a rebellion. Instead, these people were Kenyatta and Mathu's chief supporters, the constitutionalist wing of KAU. But in the post-war era, if the government could not even succeed in winning over these men by cooption, then the game was all but lost. The 'wild men', the discontented have-nots with nothing to lose, would inevitably adopt more drastic tactics.
As early as 1947, it had already become apparent that Governor Mitchell's policies had failed. The Governor, however, failed to appreciate the seriousness of the situation and the depth of African, and especially Kikuyu, disillusionment with his strategy both in the countryside and the capital. Although the Labour and Agricultural Departments warned that the social engineering campaign in the Reserves was being pushed too far too fast and that a more cautious approach was required unless the Kikuyu were to be completely antagonized and driven into revolt, the Field Administration and the Governor pushed ahead with grim determination not to be deflected by 'political agitators' like Kenyatta.21 Supported in this resolve by the Kikuyu chiefs, the Governor and his District Commissioners were convinced that they 'knew their Kikuyu' and failed to ineffective. By 1947 the peasants had perceived that they had become enmeshed in a vicious circle. Each rainy season a large proportion of the newly-dug terraces were destroyed, and by 1947 more labour was being required to preserve the terraces already built than was being used to construct new terraces. Although half the district was now terraced, even when the whole area had been protected, the demands on African labour two mornings a week would hardly diminish. Their task appeared never-ending. 74 In the Taita Hills, where the slopes were even steeper than in lNlurang'a the Agricultural Department and the Administration had perceived from the onset of the campaign that the demands posed on the peasantry to maintain short-based interval terracing would be excessive and they had pressed instead for the construction of broad-based terraces. Although these initially required far more labour, and therefore progress in protecting large acreages was considerably slower, they were able to withstand the run-off following heavy downpours and survived the rainy seasons intact. Labour intensive though they were in the short run, over the longer term they were more effective and did not require the same continual exactions from the African community. The meeting, on Sunday 21 July 1947, exemplified the problems Kenyatta had to deal with, and the reports of the meeting provide a fascinating study of how his words were interpreted by the Administration and the militants to suit their own presuppositions.78 One aspect of the terracing campaign was already giving rise to discontent and therefore government eoncern. This was the use of women to dig terraees. Discussions had already been held in the Secretariat to consider whether female labour should be banned, and a circular letter to all District Commissioners was being drafted. The overwhelming problem, however, was that over seventy per cent of terracing was actually done by Kikuyu women. To exempt them from ngwatio service would therefore destroy the foundation of the soil conservation campaign. The circular letter had not therefore been issued, pending further discussions between the Seeretariat and the Field Administration, although Britain's eommitment to International Labour Regulations, in the opinion of the Secretariat, was an irrefutable argument which would soon require compulsory female labour to be ended.79
Kenyatta began by enthusiastically praising the terracing campaign and the progress whieh had been made in Murang'a. Sueh work was essential, 
AFRICAN AFFAIRS
In these areas Mau Mau was indeed a Kikuyu civil war a civil war based to a considerable extent on social class and differing perceptions of colonial rule. Effective chiefs, because of their commitment to the modernization campaign and their position in the colonial order, were necessarily on one side, supported by the Elders and the staunch Christians; whereas those knocking on the doors of the colonial state, often mission educated clerks and ex-askaris, along with the poor, incapable of supporting their families on minute, fragmented shambas, werut into opposition although they themselves were divided into constitutionalists and militants, largely along social lines. This division after 1952 merged into that between the passive wing and the forest fighters.84
The conflict was reduced in certain locations by the ambivalent behaviour of the chiefs. In Murang'a, the outstanding example of a chief who united his people behind him rather than dividing them against him was Parmenas Githendu of location thirteen.85 Parmenas had been a prominent figure at Church Missionary Society Kahuhia in the 1920s, a hotbed of the early KCA, and in 1931 he had been selected as the Murang'a man to accompany Kenyatta, the outsider from Kiambu who was not entirely trusted by the KCA heartland of Murang'a, to give evidence to the Joint Select Committee in London. Befriended by Margery Perham, like Kenyatta, he was far more sophisticated and educated than most chiefs. Unlike Ignatio, for example, he spoke English and had contributed a brief autobiography to Perham's book, Ten Africans. As a chief, he preserved close relations with the KCA and the independent schools movement in his location. But by 1947, the local administration dismissed him as a lazy drunkard who had failed abysmally to encourage soil conservation in his location, and who had encouraged the independent schools in their campaign against Capon and the Church Missionary Society.86 To the Administration Ignatio appeared as outstanding, whereas Parmenas was a complete failure, totally discredited, and in 1948 he was dismissed. But as events were to prove, when the crisis occurred Parmenas, by conciliating rather than alienating the constitutionalist wing coffee and in Murarlga the proportion was only half a per cent.89 As a consequence the Kikuyu, unlike their neighbours, could see no reason for the white man's madness and his insistence on terracing, which often destroyed their most valuable crop, wattle, which provided the wealth of many political activists. 90 The reasons for Kamba non-involvement were difTerent again, and stemmed from the failure of the Administration to mobilize them into soil conservation and destocking after 1945. The real force of the post-war development policies was not felt in Machakos until after 1950, by which time their impact on the Kikuyu was already considerable. As a consequence discontent in Machakos did not begin to reach dangerous proportions until 1954, and in Kitui, where the modernization campaign never got off the ground) conditions remained tranquil. By 1954, howevern Machakos was nearly boiling over and the Administration came very close to losing control, just as they had two years earlier amongst the Kikuyu.9 1 According to this interpretation, the Kikuyu cause was not the unusual atavistic response of one tribe to progress but a typical response in specific circumstances. The 'Second Colonial Occupation! was accepted in Meru and Embu, and rejected in Kikuyuland; as African peasants in the former, over quite a broad cross-section of society, could see clear financial gains from their labours. Unfortunately, the carrot did not play such a major role among the Kikuyu, and the only motivating force there was the stick. But, paradoxically, the impact of post-war development was strongest amengst them. The Kikuyu reaction to this forced modernization therefore took place before the programme had really been applied to Ukambani) and their defeat provided a deterrent to Kamba militancy a few years later.
The Kiambu Paradox
The quiescence of Kiambu compared to Murang'a and Nyeri during Mau Mau can also be explained in these terms. There, the high value cash crop was not coffee but the pineapple, which by 1952 was being produced in large quantities for the Nairobi market and for Kenya Canners at Thika 92 The effect of this very high value cash crop, much more profitable than coffee, was more limited in its pacifying effects because European settlement had produced a far greater disruption of Kiambu society than in
